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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLENN C. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

D. A. OSGUTHORPE,
AFTON OSGUTHORPE, et. al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12893

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff below, as the owner of record of a small
triangular-shaped parcel of land, abutting upon State
Highway 248, running between Snyderville and Park
City, in Summit County, Utah, brought this action
against the Defendants below to quiet title to the said
land, which had been held and used continuously as
their own by the Defendants and their predecessors in
interest for more than 20 years.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following pre-trial, two issues were reserved for
trial on January 27, 1972, in the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, Judge George E. Ballif, presiding:
( l) Whether the fence running parallel to the highway and completely enclosing the property within
Defendant's pasture is a boundary within the meaning
of the legal doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence so
that Defendants have acquired title to the property
in dispute herein, and
(2) Whether Defendants' driving, trailing, and

crossing of livestock over the property in dispute herein
has given Defendants a prescriptive easement to the
continued use of said property in dispute without interference from Plaintiff.

On February 22, 1972, Judgment was entered
against the Defendants, ordering them to relinquish
possession of the land and quieting title thereto in the
Plaintiff. Defendants thereafter filed a motion to set
aside the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and for a new trial, which was denied by the
Court on March 28, 1972.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1896, the father of Patrick McPolin, the predecessor in interest of the Defendants below, acquired
a tract of land comprising some 160 acres in Summit
2

County, Utah. At that time this property abutted upon
the Southwest side and was separated by a fence from
the old D. & R.G.W. railroad right-of-way. The railroad right-of-way was parallelled on its Northeast side
by the old highway running between Snyderville and
Park City, Utah.
Upon the death of his father in 1921, title to the
above described property passed to Patrick McPolin.
Thereafter, in 1928, the younger McPolin sold off
a 100 foot-wide strip of land, adjacent to the railroad
right-of-way and running on a diagonal line from the
Northwest corner to the Southeast corner of his property, to the County for a new highway right-of-way.
Upon the completion of the new State Highway 248,
running between Snyderville and Park City, Utah, later
that year, McPolin erected a new fence to contain his
cattle, and marking his relocated boundary line along
the new highway right-of-way. Approximately four
to six years thereafter, between 1932 and 1934, McPolin erected a second fence, approximately 40 or 50
feet inside of, and running parallel to, his highway
fence. Thus, the so-called inner fence and the highway
fence formed a lane or passageway, which was used
continuously and without interruption thereafter, first
by McPolin for some 12 or 13 years until he sold his
property to the Defendants in 1947, and thereafter by
the Defendants until the present time, for the purpose
of driving or trailing their cattle, back and forth, between the area of the barn on the Southeast side, and
some pastureland on the Northwest side of their property.
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l
McPolin had a survey of his property made in
1935, about a year after the erection of the so-called
inner fence. The survey revealed to the McPolins for
the first time that the Bamberger family, who owned
additional properties Northeast of the railroad rightof-way, held title of record to a small triangle-shaped
parcel of land, approximately 1/2 acre in size, and which
as indicated above, has become the focus of this dispute.
The hypoteneuse of the disputed triangle is marked
by a section of the McPolin highway fence, and the
two unmarked sides extend therefrom toward the McPolin property and meet at an apex a few feet beyond
the inner fence. Thus, the disputed triangle is surrounded on two sides by the McPolin property and is
crossed by the lane or passageway used by McPolin
to trail his cattle to and from his barn and pasture.
McPolin did nothing about the information revealed by his survey. He made no effort to contact the
Bambergers in regard to their interests, nor did he
disclose to or make the Defendants aware thereof when
he conveyed his property to them in 1947. He continued
to use the disputed parcel as he had always done. When
title passed to the Defendants, they continued to use
the disputed property in the same manner and for the
same purposes as their predecessors, driving and trailing
as many as 100 cows back and forth across this small
piece of land.

[

r
'

(
f

(
'

[

I
J

\

I

In 1968, the Plaintiff below became the owner of
record of the disputed property. A sign posted upon
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the said property about a year before this action was
entered by the Plaintiff below in July, 1970, served
as notice to the Defendants of the conflicting claim to
the property which they had used and considered as
their own for so many years.

.

POINT I .

.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE .
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I. The Defendants' (appellants') claim to the dis-

puted property is founded upon the doctrines of: (a)
boundary by acquiescence andVor ( b) prescriptive
easement. In its Findings of Fact Nos. I and 2, the
Court below found, respectively, that "plaintiff . . .
and his predecessors in interest have always paid any
taxes thereon (the disputed property)," and "defendants have not paid any taxes thereon (the disputed
property) ." By statute 1 , the land must be continuously
occupied for seven years and all taxes must have been
paid by the party, his predecessors and grantors for the
establishment of adverse possession. The establishment
of a boundary by acquiescence is distinct from establishment by adverse possession, however, and it does not
necessarily involve the question of adverse possession. 2
Also, it should be pointed out that the Utah statute
does not apply to rights-of-way or any other class of
easement by prescription, and can only be applied by
1 Section 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
2 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, §78.
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analogy. 3 The Defendants' claim herein is not based
upon analogy to the statute, but upon a holding for
the full prescriptive period of 20 years or more. Hence,
the payment of taxes is not a requisite of the Defendants'
position under either of the doctrines upon which the
Defendants rely. The Court accordingly erred in advancing the implication that the Defendants' claim is
bottomed on the requirements of the Utah statute.
2. In its Findings of Fact No. 4, the Court found,

inter alia, that: "There is no fence between plaintiff's
and defendants' property." As to the location of the
fence along the highway right-of-way, upon cross examination Patrick M. McPolin testified as follows:
"Q. I see. So this fence ran along your property
and alone the adjoining land owners' property along the highway?

A. Which fence do you mean?

Q. This fence (indicating) .
A. The one-against the highway?
Q. Yes.

A. No. I built that fence on my own property."
This was the only testimony presented to the Court
relative to the location of the highway fence, other than
the fact that it generally fallowed along the highway
right-of-way. If, in fact, the highway fence was built
on McPolin's property, the record is otherwise silent
as to how far inside (i.e., Southwest) of the highway
3 Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 Pac. 291.
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right-of-way line the fence was built. However, if in
fact the fence was built on McPolin's property and
inside of the true boundary separating the highway
right-of-way from the said property, if by only a few
feet, then the fence would be a fence separating the
property of two adjoining land owners. Testimony to
this effect having been presented by the Defendants'
witness, McPolin, it was then incumbent upon the Plaintiff, as the party claiming that the said fence did not
separate the property of two adjoining land owners,
to rebut it. This the Plaintiff failed to do. In rebuttal,
Plaintiff submitted as its Exhibit No. I ( R. 48, 49),
a surveyor's certificate dated July 28, 1967, which
showed the location of the disputed parcel of land in
relation to the highway and to the McPolin tract. Plain·
tiff's exhibit did not show, however, either the location
or the existence of the highway fence. The only fence
shown by Plaintiff's exhibit was a fence running across
the disputed property parallel to and approximately
100 feet inside of ( i.e, Southwest) the highway fence.
The Plaitniff offered no other evidence concerning the
location of the highway fence. Thus, he failed to sustain
his burden of proof in asserting that the said fence was
not a fence separating the property of two adjoining
land owners, and the Court erred in sustaining Plaintiff's contention in this regard.
3. The Court"s Finding of Fact No. 5, that "de-

fendants have used their property only for pasture for
their livestock," is clearly in error, contrary to the
Court's pre-trial order respecting the issues reserved
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for trial, and is contraverted by the record on this point
(R. 12, 15, 21, 26). Both McPolin and the Defendant,
Dr. Osguthorpe, testified that they had used various
parts of the property as farm ground, for haying and
mowing, and for grazing and trailing dairy stock across
it.
4. In its Finding of Fact No. 6, the Court found
that the Defendants' predecessor in interest, McPolin,
constructed the fence along the highway right-of-way
for the purpose of protecting his cattle and that the
said fence was not intended to mark a boundary between
his property and the property of any other private person. There was no testimony directly on this point.
Patrick McPolin was never asked whether the fence
along the highway right-of-way was intended to mark
a boundary between his property and the property of
any other private person. On direct examination, McPolin, in fixing the time when the highway fence was
built, volunteered (R. 12) the following information:

"Q. Can you tell the Court when you constructed
those fences?
A. Well, this fence here had to be constructed
about the same time the highway was built
because they left me out in the open without
any protection for my livestock from the
highway."
The foregoing is the only basis for the Court's finding
that the sole purpose for the erection of the highway
fence was for the protection of McPolin's livestock.
It cannot be denied that the protection of his livestock
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was an important motive, insofar as McPolin was concerned, for the construction of the highway fence. It
is unreasonable and unfair to conclude, however, particularly in the absence of any direct inquiry, any further expressions by McPolin, any independent evidence
of any kind adduced by the Plaintiff, that McPolin
built the highway fence solely to protect his cattle. A
party's intent is to be determined from all of the circumstances present, and not from an isolated remark
taken out of context to the question which provoked
it. Counsel for Defendants also objected to such a
strained characterization of McPolin's testimony (R.
28) . A person's actions and conduct are more illuminative of his intent than his words. McPolin built the
highway fence along his boundary with the highway
right-of-way, and as he stated (R. 21), just exactly
like the railroad fence (on the opposite side of the
highway). McPolin's actions certainly indicate that he
regarded the highway fence as a boundary, and as a
replacement for the boundary fence running along the
railroad right-of-way, and which had been severed from
the McPolin property by the sale of a strip of his land
for the new highway. When the fence was built (1928)
McPolin did not know that the fence would become a
boundary between his property and the property of any
adjoining private person, since he was unaware at that
time of the existence of the disputed property. It is
also true that in 1935, when McPolin's survey disclosed
Bamberger's title of record, the fence in fact became
a boundary between the McPolin tract (see Par. 2,
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supra) and the property now in dispute. McPolin testified that he gave no thought to securing permission
from the Bamberger's to use the disputed property
(R. 20, 21). When the Defendants acquired the McPolin tract in 1947 they were unaware of the Bamberger's interests, and also of the purposes or intentions
of McPolin at the time the fence was erected. To the
Defendants, as to all the world at large, the highway
fence represented the boundary line of the McPolin
tract, and Dr. Osguthorpe so testified (R. 27). The
Court erred in otherwise construing McPolin's intent.
5. The Court's Finding of Fact No. 7, that the

highway fence does not separate the properties of adjoining land owners or their predecessors, is not supported by the record in that Plaintiff failed to rebut
the evidence presented by the Defendants that the highway fence was constructed on McPolin's property,failed
to offer any evidence concerning the location of the
highway fence, and failed to shoulder its burden of
proof in claiming that the highway fence has never
separated land owned by the Plaintiff and the Defendants, or their predecessors in interest (see par. 2, supra).
6. The Court found in its Finding of Fact No. 8

that: "There has not been a fence acros said property
in dispute during the time that Defendants have had
possession thereof." While there is conflicting evidence
as to whether or not such a fence was maintained in
good repair at all times, the Court's finding that such
a fence had never crossed the disputed property during
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the Defendant's possession thereof is clearly at variance
with the evidence, and with the Court's own comments
concerning Dr. Osguthorpe's testimony thereon (R.
58). Plaintiff's own Exhibit No. 1, Certificate of Survey, dated July 28, 1967, clearly shows (R. 49) the
existence of a fence running in a straight line across
the disputed property at that time. On direct examination, the Plaintiff testified ( R. 49) that he had
walked across the disputed property, and that there
were some old rotted fence posts marking a fence line
across the property. The time of this examination of
the disputed property by the Plaintiff was not established, but it was apparently sometime after the survey
had been made. On cross examination Plaintiff testified ( R. 50) that he had examined the said property
in 1968 when he purchased it,and again in 1970 (R.
51), and at that time "there were a lot of fence posts
and there were no long wires on them" (R. 51). Plaintiff also testified (R. 52) that there was a fence presently (January, 1972) across the disputed property.
Attention is here called to the fact that Plaintiff,s
knowledge of the existence of such a fence, and its
condition of repair, is limited by his own testimony to
a period of time no earlier than 1968, at which time
the Defendants had been in possession of the said property for more than 21 years. In contrast to Plaintiff's
evidence, Defendants' predecessor in interest, McPolin,
testified that he built the fence in question some time
between 1931 and 1934; that he had used the land or
passageway formed by the said fence and the highway
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fence to drive and trail his livestock back and forth
between his barn and his pasture, and that such fence
was continually used for this purpose until he (McPolin) sold his property to Dr. Osguthorpe in 1946
(R. 12, 13). On direct examination the Defendant,
Dr. Osguthorpe, testified ( R. 26) that the location of
the two fences had not been changed since he acquired
the property in 1947, and that the land between the
two fences had been used continually during the intervening period, for trailing his livestock back and forth.
Further, on cross examination, Dr. Osguthorpe testified (R .29) that he had not constructed a fence across
the disputed property within the past year (January,
1972), that the same fence presently crossing the disputed tract was there when he bought the property
(1947) and that although the said fence might have
been repaired from time to time it had not been changed
and that the said fence had wires on it a year previously
(R. 30).
7. There is no evidence in the record to support the
Court's Findings of Fact No. 9, that "a stream mean-

ders at undetermined points through said property in
dispute." The Plaintiff offered no testimony or evidence
of any kind concerning the location of the stream.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I, Certificate of Survey, does
not show the stream which meanders through parts of
the McPolin tract. On direct examination the Defendants' witness, McPolin, testified (R. 11) that: "the
creek runs in and out but most of the creek is in between
the two fences." This is a general description of the
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course of the stream through the McPolin property,
but it does not pertain to the property in dispute, as
the record clearly shows. On cross examination McPolin testified that the meanders of the stream did
not extend to the inner fence at any point, so that a
dry strip of ground remained for trailing his cattle
inside of and between the inner fence and the meanders
of the stream ( R. 18, 19). McPolin twice denied that
the stream extended as far as the tip of the undisputed
triangle ( R. 19) . As to the proximity of the stream
to the disputed triangle, McPolin testified (R. 19, 20)
as follows:
"Q. But you don't know whether it comes within the triangle in a bend there or not?

A. Well, it's pretty crooked. There might be a
bend above it or a bend below it. But where
this particular triangle is-well, see, when I
sold this particular right-of-way I sold them
the ground for a right-of-way. Then when
they started to work they started to straighten the ditch out there and take it off the
highway, which there was no ground, so I
stopped them. I didn't let them construct
that. So there was a piece there that they
had done before I got down there that is
pertnear straight that runs along the fence
on the highway, on this piece here, between
the highway and that other fence. ( indicating)
Q. Right. But you don't know where it comes
in re la ti on to this little triangle?
A. It's quite a ways away from that little triangle."
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On both direct and cross examination the Defendant,
Dr. Osguthorpe, also testified (R. 25, 29) that at a
point opposite the disputed triangle the stream runs
parallel to the highway and on the highway right-ofway, outside of the disputed triange, and between the
fence and the highway right-of-way. It is clear from
the record that the stream does not cross or meander
through the disputed property. The record is also clear
that the Court erred in so finding.
8. In its Findings of Fact No. IO, the Comt found

that "the defendants have not driven their cattle across
said property on a precise trail or path for any determined period of time." The record does not support
this finding. As previously indicated (see Par. 3, supra),
Defendant's predecessor, McPolin, testified that he had
used the disputed property for more than 12 years
( 1934-1946) to trail his cattle back and forth between
his barn and pastureland (R. 12, 13); that his user was
continual, uninterrupted and exclusive (R. 13). Further, on cross examination McPolin also testified that
there were no spots in- the fence that were open to the
pasture on the side (R. 18); that the stream did not
interrupt or interpose an obstacle to the passage across
the disputed property (R. 19,20). McPolin also testified that the inner fence was about 40 or 50 feet from
the highway fence (R. 54); that both fences were presently in the same place as they were when constructed;
and that he had used the disputed property continuously
for the same purpose as Dr. Osguthorpe ( R. 55). The
Defendant, Dr. Osguthorpe, testified that he had used
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the same disputed property for 25 years (1947-1972)driving and trailing as many as 100 cows ( R. 43)
across it, continually and without interruption; that
the fences had not been changed during that period of
time (R. 30, 44) and that the stream did not traverse
the disputed property (R. 29). Plaintiff offered no
testimony of his own, and attempted only to contravert
the evidence submitted by Defendants by attempting
to show that: ( 1) the meanders of the stream intruded
upon a direct passageway across the disputed property
(see Par. 7, supra), and (2) there had been no inner
fence across the disputed property during the time that
it had been held by the Defendants. Plaintiff's own
Exhibit No. 1 clearly refutes the latter contention.
Plaintiff also sought to impeach Dr. Osguthorpe's
testimony concerning the existence of the inner fence
by his answer to a two-part question excerpted from
his prior deposition (R. 36, et seq.), which was admitted
into evidence by stipulation (R. 60). As pointed out by
the Court, however, Dr. Osguthorpe's seemingly inconsistent answer was contradicted by the physical
evidence of the existence of the fence (R. 58). This
seeming inconsistency also had been fully clarified by
his testimony on redirect examination (R. 41). The
Defendants having presented evidence showing all of
the elements necessary to the establishment of a uniform, direct, and precise way across the disputed
property, and of its open, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted use for a period of more than 20 years,
it then became necessary for the Plaintiff to assume
the burden of proof required to sustain his contention
15

that the Defendants failed to drive their cattle across
the disputed property in a precise path. This the Plaintiff failed to do, and the Court erred accordingly in
sustaining the Plaintiff's position.
9. The Plaintiff presented no evidence to support
the Court's Findings of Fact No. 11, that Defendants

did not intend to establish an easement or way across
the disputed property. As pointed out heretofore in
Par. 4, supra, a person's intent is to be construed from
all of the circumstances and facts available, and particularly from his actions. While it is true that McPolin
was unaware of the Bamberger's title of record at the
time his adverse user began, his actions nevertheless
clearly demonstrated that his intentions were hostile
and adverse to the Bambergers once the survey had
revealed their interest. This information made no difference to McPolin. He testified that he thought nothing
about it, and that he continued to use the disputed
property in the same manner and for the same purposes
as previously. The Defendants likewise were unaware
of the Plaintiff's claim until 2 years before this action
was entered, but they also continued thereafter the
adverse user of the disputed property, openly, notoriously, and contrary to the rights and interests of the
Plaintiff therein. The Defendant's knowledge or lack
of knowledge of the Plaintiff's interest in the disputed
property is not determinative of their intent or lack
of intent in the establishment of an adverse user. In
the absence of other evidence the Court erred in supporting the Plaintiff therein.
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POINT II
THE JUDGlVIENT OF THE COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
I. The court erred in holding that the fence running

parallel to the highway and completely enclosing the
property claimed by Plaintiff within Defendants' pasture is not a boundary within the meaning of the legal
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence in that said fence
was constructed by the predecessor of defendants for
the purpose of protecting cattle from the right-of-way.
The judgment of the Court in this particular is based
upon its Finding of Fact No. 6, that the said fence
was not intended by Defendants' predecessor to mark
a boundary between his property and the property of
any other private person, The Defendants contend that
the said finding is not supported by the evidence (Par.
4, supra).
Intention has been defined "as an emotion or
operation of the mind; 4 a mental attitude made known
by acts ;5 the state of mind with which an act is done
or contemplated ;6 and has been defined as 7 the tendency
imputed by law to an act; the voluntary purposing of an
act; 8 and volition. 9 It implies premeditation and purpose."10 While, in the popular mind, "intent" and "mo4 State v. Musick, 14 S.W. 212, 215, 101 Mo. 260.
5 In re Richenell Fabric Mfg. Co., D.C. Pa. 31 F. Supp. 645, 648.
6 Hollister v. State, 59 N.E. 847, 848, 156 Ind. 255.
7 Pennsylvania Co. v. Reesor, 108 N.E. 983, 986. 60 Ind. App. 636.
8 Williams v. State, 204 N.W. 64, 66. 113 Neb. 606.
9 Ernest v. State, 20 Fla. 383, 388.
10 Yoder v. U. S., C.C.A. Okl., 80 F.2d 66, 670.
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tive" are not infrequently regarded as one and the same
thing, and, while they have the common characteristic
of not being susceptible of proof other than by inference arising from the existence of other facts, in law
there is a clear distinction between them, and they are
not regarded as synonymous. 11
The Court's findings here as to the intention of the
Defendant's predecessor in constructing the highway
fence may be assumed to the based upon McPolin's
statement while on the stand, and in response to a
question as to when the fence was built, that "they left
me out in the open without any protection for my livestock from the highway." (Par. 4, supra). Conversely,
the Court seems to find the proper intention of McPolin
wanting because he did not declare while on the stand,
not having been asked, that he intended the fence to
serve as a boundary between the property of an adjoining private person, not knowing of the existence of
such a property, insisting apparently that some positive
declarations are necessary in order to show the character
of the use to which the fence is put. To the contrary,
we think that the correct rule is that stated by the court
in W ashmwnd v. Harm 12 in determining the right to
widen a highway:
"But it would seem that such statements could
have but little weight. Where the inquiry is as
to the extent of a person at a particular time
(such extent is) better made known by his con11 46 C.J.S. Intent, p. 1104.
12 36 Wash. 170, 78 P. 777.
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duct at the time in question than by his subsequent declarations as to what his intent then was.
The examination of the respondent was directed
to determine his intent from his conduct, and it
seems to us that it matters little that he was not
asked the direct question concerning his intent
while using the way."
To the same effect, citing the W ashmund case, and
Hughes v. Boyer 13 , wherein the above statement was
quoted with approval, the Court in Northwest Cities
Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co. 14 held:
"It is not necessary to the establishment of a
prescriptive right that the claimant makes declarations of an adverse intent during the period
relied upon to establish such right, or that he
testify later that his intent was of that character;
the intentions and attitudes of the parties may
be shown by evidence as to their conduct relative
to the use of the right of way in question."

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is described as a rule of repose for the purpose of quieting
titles and discouraging confusing and vexatious litigation.15 The doctrine seems to occupy a middle ground
between adverse possession and estoppel in pais. In
adverse possession it is still requisite in many states that
there be an intent to claim up to a marked division
line without reference to where the true line may be,
and, if it appears that there was only an intent to hold
to the true line, the possession is not adverse, and no
13 5 Wash2d 81, 104 P.2d 760.
14 13 Wash.2d 75, 123 P.2d 771.
15 8 Am. Jur. Boundaries §80.
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title by prescription may be obtained. Some authorities
have held that no title by adverse possession can be
acquired through a mistake, although in the greater
number of cases at least some mistake exists when possession is taken of another's property. 16 There is an
inherent fallacy, however, present in this so-called
'true-line' doctrine, which results in ascribing legal
essentiality to the "subjective hostile intention" requisite thereto. The courts have said that the fallacy lies
in the emphasis placed upon what the innocent and
mistaken possessor would have intended had he known
the facts-as in the instant case-rather than upon his
actual, visible, and notorious acts. It is to be inferred
that a possessor's notorious use and occupation of land
which he believes to be his own is nevertheless hostile
to all the world in the meaning appropriate to adverse
possession. 17
" . . . . The modern trend and the better rule
is that where the visible boundaries have existed
for the period set forth in the Statute of Limitations, title will vest in the adverse possessor
where there is evidence of unequivocable acts of
ownership. In this view it is immaterial that the
holder supposed the visible boundary to be correct or, in other words, the fact that the possession was due to inadvertence, ignorance, or mistake, is entirely immaterial." 18
The authors of American Law of Property (Vol.
16 69 A.L.R. 1431
17 Predham v. Hofester, 108 A.2d 458
18 Tamburo v. Miller, 203 Md. 329, 100 A.2d 818 (1953)
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III, § 15.5, at pp. 786, 789) have expressed the following conclusions:
" .... The weight of authority strongly supports the position that the mental attitude of the
possessor is immaterial, and an actual open and
notorious possession which is wrongful since it
is without the consent of the owner is necessarily
adverse and ripens into title in the usual way
when the period of the statute has run.

*

*

*

*

"Why a man without title who as an honest
man admits that he wanted only what was his,
and occupied in the belief that the land was his,
should be worse off than the wilful wrongdoer
who enters and occupies in order to get title by
adverse possession is not explained in these cases.
They are necessarily wrong as a matter of legal
principle because they disregard the plain operation of the statute of limitations which alone
gives title by adverse possession. They are highly
inexpedient, if we look at the matter from the
practical standpoint, because they substitute all
the uncertainties and ambiguities which arise out
of a test dependent on proof of an actual mental
state for the simple objective physical test of
possession actually adverse evidenced by acts of
user and enjoyment of the average owner."
Frequently quoted in the more recent treatises dealing with this feature of the law of adverse possession is
the following statement in 2 Dembitz, Land Titles
(1895) 1397:

"If possession through mistake were held not to
be adverse, very little room would be left for the
statute of limitations, for almost every man who
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buys land under a bad title labors under the mistaken idea that his deed is good and effectual."

See, Tiffany, Real Property ( 3d ed.) § ll59, p.
471; Thompson, Real Property (perm. ed.) §§ 2645,
2649, pp. 452, 461.
In a steadily increasing number of jurisdictions,1 9
the possession is the important element, and it is held
that such possession is not the less adverse because the
person takes possession-or by analogy to the instant
case, establishes a boundary-of the land in question
innocently and through mistake. In other words, it is the
visible and adverse possession, with an intention to
possess land occupied under a belief that it is the possessor's own, that constitutes its adverse character, and not
the remote view or belief of the possessor. Or as stated
in I R.C.L. 733, "The mere fact of possession is allowed
to override the intention; and it is held that a possession
beyond the true boundary line, irrespective of the intention with which it was taken, becomes adverse."
Numerous cases support this view.
Thus it is concluded, by analogy, that the weight of
authority strongly supports the Defendants' position
that it is not necessary to the establishment of a boundary
by acquiescence that the claimant makes declarations of
what his intent was at the time the boundary was estab19 See the leading case, Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273
P. 908; Medina v. Brown, 172 Cal.App.(2d) 208, 342 P.2d
342 (1959); Norgard v. Busher, 220 Ore. 297, 349 P.2d 490
(1960); French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1931); Lucas v. Provines, 130 Cal. 270, 62 P. 509 (1900); Rennert v. Shirk, 163
Ind. 542, 72 N.E. 546 (1904).

22

Iished, and that his intent is better made known by his
conduct at the time in question than by his subsequent
declarations as to what his intent then was, or as to what
it might have been at any given time had he then possession of all the facts. It is submitted, accordingly, that
the Court erred in holding that the said fence was constructed by Defendants' predecessor for the purpose of
protecting his cattle.
(b) The court erred in holding that the Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof
in establishing a prescriptive easement to run
livestock over the property in dispute in that
no precise trail or way has been established.
We have previously discussed herein the shortcomings of the court's findings of fact on the 'precise trail'
issue, and the infirmitives of the Plaintiff's evidence
thereon (see Par. 8, pp. 14, 15, supra). It is not necessary to burden the record further with another review
of the evidence presented by the parties. It has been
held that to acquire an easement by prescription, there
must exist a user that is adverse, hostile, continuous,
uninterrupted, visible, and notorious, showing an intent
to claim as against the true owner under a claim of
right with such notoriety that the latter may be aware
thereof and thereby be enabled to resist acquisition of
the right before the period of prescription has elapsed. 20
Also, a prescriptive right of way, for example, cannot
be acquired to pass over a tract of land generally; such
right must be confined to a specific way, or a definite,
20 Plaza v. Flak, 7 NJ 215, 81 A2d 137
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certain, and precise line, which has been used as the
right-of-way. Generally speaking, therefore, the adverse use must have been over a uniform route. 21
"This does not mean that a person using the
right-of-way may not deviate at all from the
travelled rut or track, to the extent at least, that
this may become necessary in a reasonable use
of the right-of-way; but it does mean that the
claimant may not abandon one track or rightof-way and adopt another." 22
The law does not make it essential that the mode
or manner of use shall have been precisely the same
through the period of prescription; immaterial changes
or variations in the use do not destroy its identity. Reviewing the Defendants' use of the disputed property
in the light of the fore going principles, it can be said
that no evidence was presented to show that their use
of the disputed property was not continuous, open,
notorious, hostile, and showing an intent to claim against
the true
The path or way was direct and uniform,
between the same destinations at all times. There was
no evidence to show any variations in the travelled path
or way, other than the testimony of the plaintiff that
in 1968 some of the fence posts did not have wires on
them. The sufficiency of the inner fence to contain
the cattle within the path or way appears to be the only
question raised by the Plaintiff in this regard, and
his observations were limited to a period no earlier
than 1968 - subsequent to the lapse of the prescriptive
21 17A Am.Jur. Eastments Sec. 79
22 Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33

period. In the absence of statute, a sufficient fence is
said to be one which will turn ordinary stock. One who
holds that a fence under such circumstances is not
sufficient must assume the burden of proving it. This
the Plaintiff failed to do. The width and length of the
travelled way would be considerations bearing upon
the uniformity of the use, and the possibility of any
variations therefrom. The length of the way was only
125 feet, based upon the scale of Plaintiff's surveyor's
certificate, along the inner fence. The width approximately 100 feet by the same evidence - but only 40 to
50 feet according to .McPolin. These dimensions would
tend to show that cattle being trailed or driven through
the confines of such a limited path or way would have
scant opportunity to breach a fence. The extent and
character of a way acquired by prescription are fixed
by the user under which it is acquired. 23 The Plaintiff
failed to present any substantial evidence to show any
deviations from the Defendants' established and uninterrupted use of the disputed property, and it is concluded accordingly that the court erred in holding
that Defendants failed to establish a precise trail or·
way thereon.

---

(c) The court erred in holding that the Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof
in establishing a prescriptive easement . . . . in
that the evidence does not show the necessary
adverse quality of use either in defendant's
predecessor, McPolin, or in
in defendant
in knowing that the property bemg used belonged
to another party.

23 28 C.J.S. Easements

§

77-c.
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We have heretofore challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the court's findings of fact on
tWs issue. Attention is also directed to our discussion
of the element of intent and the increasing tendency
in many jurisdictions to ascribe the necessary hostile
intent to a possessor's notorious use and occupation of
land which he may mistakenly believe to be his own and that such a user will ripen into adverse possession
if continued for the prescriptive period (see p, 18-22,
supra). Generally, the hostile and adverse character of
the user necessary to establish an easement by prescription is the same as that which is necessary to establish
title by adverse possession. 24 A use wWch is not hostile
and adverse will not ripen into a prescriptive right,
and there is no presumption of easement until the claimant has shown adverse use for the required period of
time. However, it is only the use to which the premises
are put which must be shown to be adverse. 25 To the
extent that the use is established, it is of course hostile
to the title of the servient estate. id. We believe that
the instant case, acco.rdingly, is governed by those same
principles enunciated in Northwest Cities Gas Co. v.
Western Fuel Co., Rock Springs v. Sturm, etc., supra.
We hold, accordingly, that where a possessor, as in the
instant case, mistakenly enters upon the ground of another in the belief that it is his own, and exercises thereupon an open and notorious user for the full prescriptive period, he thereby acquires a prescriptive easement.
24 17A Am.Jur. Easements § 76.
25 Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Ariz. 228, 233 P.2d 442.
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We believe this to be the better, modem rule and that
the judgment of the court on this issue is in error.
POINT III
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO MAKE
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS TO WARRANT
ITS JUDGMENT THAT THE FENCE RUNNING PARALLEL TO THE HIGHWAY ....
IS NOT A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
.... SINCE THE FENCE DOES NOT SEP ARATE LANDS .... OWNED BY PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT OR THEIR PREDECESSORS, IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Rule 52 (a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure26 ,
inter alia, provides that the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon. Failure of the trial court to make findings
of fact on all material issues is reversible error where
it is prejudicial. 27
Defendants allege herein (see pp. 8, 12, supra) that
the court's Findings of Fact No. 4, and No. 7, respectively, and both of which are directed to the location
and use of the highway fence, are not supported by
the evidence. Indeed, as previously noted, Plaintiff
offered no evidence to show the exact location of the
26 Vol. 9, Utah Code Ann. (1953) pp.142 (1971 Pocket Supp).
27 Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 U.2d 43, 278 P.2d 284,
285.
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said fence vis-a-vis the disputed property, the Defendants' property, or the highway right-of-way. McPolin
testified that the highway fence was built wholly on
his property. This being the fact, and there was no
evidence to rebut it, the possibility becomes very real
that the highway fence does separate the disputed property from the Defendants' property, contrary to the
court's Findings of Fact, and the judgment entered
herein. As previously noted, the surveyor's certificate
offered in evidence by the Plaintiff did not show the
highway fence. Its fixed location is central to the Defendants' case. In the absence of more adequate findings on this point the Defendants are prejudiced under
the rule cited above, and the omission of such findings
by the court is reversible error.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein the Court is requested to enter an order in this cause reversing the
decision of the trial court and ordering that court to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against
the Plaintiff, or, that the Court order a new trial and
that the decision of the trial court be reversed, and
that the court be ordered to amend its findings of fact
and conclusions of law in accordance with the facts set
forth herein, or, that the judgment of the trial court be
reversed, and that the court be ordered to hold a new
trial.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th
day of July, 1972.
McMILLAN & BROWNING
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
George M. McMillan, Esq.
Paul L. Badger, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
and Apepllants
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